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STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
CHARLES W. TAGGART, Trustee, a 
partnership, First Security Bank of Utah, 
a Utah Corporation, and Zions First Na-
tional Bank, a Utah Corporation, Mort-
gagees, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT PARTNERSHIP 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
At the outset, counsel for Defendant asks the Court's 
indulgence for the length of this Brief. It quite exceeds the 
average in size. But the enormity of this case and the ques-
tions raised in this Appeal have dictated the need for added 
length of the Brief, at least if the issues urged are to be 
given their rightful attention. 
The questions of fact at trial were prodigious both in 
number and scope. Entailed was the examination and the 
evaluation, under two different sets of conditions, of a tract 
of land in a vital urban area that was 10 city blocks long 
and 15 city blocks wide. It was tantamount to the trial of 
Case No. 
10594 
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two dozen or more land condemnation suits at once, involv-
ing every basic land use known excepting agriculture. In 
pure number of issues and land value conclusions, it is no 
doubt the largest condemnation suit ever tried in Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a suit in condemnation brought by the Re-
spondent Road Commission in July, 1965, to expropriate 
land of the Defendant-partnership for the development of 
sections of Interstate Highway 215 and 2100 South Ex-
pressway between 2100 South and 3100 South in Salt 
Lake County. 
Jurisdictional questions relating to the right of the 
State to condemn Appellant's land, public use and neces-
sity of the "taking," and the requirement that the project 
design be consistent with the greatest public good and the 
least private injury, were not placed in dispute, and the 
case proceeded to trial by jury on the amount to be paid 
as Just Compensation for the 78 db acres condemned and for 
the damages accruing to the remaining properties by rea-
son of the partial-expropriation, the highway severance 
and the construction of the project as contemplated. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The issues of Just Compensation were tried to a jury 
before the District Court of Salt Lake County in January, 
1966. On January 22, the trial Court entered judg-
ment, based on special interrogatories returned by the 
jury, for $359,877.00. (R. 98-99) Defendant-landowner 
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filed a timely motion for additur and new trial in the alter-
native, and for new trial alone (R. 107-109), which mo-
tions, upon hearing, were denied by the lower Court. (R. 
131) From the judgment of January 22, Defendant ap-
peals on issues of law. (R. 133,137,138) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
It is urged by Defendant in this Appeal that the judg-
ment of the lower Court be reversed and that the case be 
remanded for new trial on the issues of Just Compensa-
tion. 
MAP OF SUBJECT PROPERTY AND TAKING 
Attached as Appendix 6 is a replica of trial Exhibit 
1, representative of the prominent characteristics of the 
property and the freeway "taking". In general, the base 
plat depicts the property and its surroundings as existent 
in July, 1965, prior to condemnation. The total property is 
shown in yellow, the irregular black lines within the total 
tract being indicative of water and drainage courses serv-
ing the land, a power line right-of-way running north, 
southeast and east, and in the southeast section, an area 
formerly known as Decker Lake. Major roadways which 
served the land are colored brown. 
The property condemned and the freeway alignment 
as it cuts through the total tract, are set out on clear 
plastic which overlays the base map. The non-access right-
of-way lines, center line, and mushrooming interchange at 
the north are shown in the "taking" area. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The evidence and expert testimony on Just Compensa-
tion in the case were focused on two considerations: 
1. The highest and best use and fair market value 
of the total property BEFORE the "taking" by the 
Government of the 78zb acres, as of the date of 
service of summons, July 12,1965; 
2. The highest and best use and fair market value 
of the Defendant's remaining property AFTER 
the "taking" of the 78±: acres, weighing the na-
ture and affect of the "taking," of the severance 
created and of the construction and establish-
ment of the highway project. 
Consequently, this Statement will be addressed to those 
factors. 
1. Total Property BEFORE the "Taking" 
The property condemned by the Respondent was in 
July, 1965, part of a larger unified and integrated tract 
of 927 ± acres located immediately west of Redwood Road 
(1700 West) and extending west to about 3200 West be-
tween 2100 South and 3100 South in Salt Lake County. 
(Ex. 1, Tr. 255-257) At the date of value, it was owned 
or being purchased by the Defendant, TAGGART TRUST-
EE, a partnership of businessmen and lawyers. (Tr. 55-58) 
The land lay as undeveloped acreage. Such condition ex-
isted not because of a lack in demand for industrial, resi-
dential and commercial uses for the property, but because 
the former owner, prior to 1962, had not attempted any 
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development, and because the present Defendant-landowner, 
after 1962, had been stalled in its development plans due 
to the imminency of the freeway project through the middle 
of the tract. (Tr. 49-51) 
The total ownership commanded <\n area of in city 
blocks north to south, touching on the north the largest 
industrial center in Salt Lake City, and on the south, south-
west and east, developed residential subdivisions. (Ex. D-l, 
P- l l , Tr. 142, 258, 411-415) With highway frontage of 
2400 feet on 2100 South Street, 2750 feet on Redwood 
Road and better than 2700 feet on 3100 South Street (all 
said frontage with full and open access) (Tr. 142, 146-147, 
256, 426), with water, sewer, gas, and power immediately 
available on the property (overlay Ex. D-lA, Tr. 255), 
with zoning which permitted industrial, commercial and 
residential use (Ex. D-18, Tr. 147, 414), and with a genu-
ine demand and need for immmediate development of the 
subject property (Tr. 48, 147-153, 412-415, 257), it was 
the informed judgment of the three experts, C. FRANCIS 
SOLOMON, WERNER KIEPE, and MAXWELL LOLL, 
called as witnesses by Defendant-landowner that the high-
est and best use of the whole property, prior to condemna-
tion, was: 
tlle north one-third (233± acres) . . . industrial with 
direct access from 2100 South and Redwood 
Road; 
some 40 acres having 1,600 feet of Redwood Road 
frontage zoned C-2 . . . a commercial center with 
direct access from Redwood Road; 
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the balance of 532 ± acres at the center and soutn . . 
residential with access from Redwood Road, 2100 
South and 3100 South. (Tr. 90-92, 152-154, 257-
259,266-268,271-275,425-427,429-432) 
To compliment these findings, Leon Frehner, noted land 
planner in Utah, testified for the Defendant as to a feasible 
plan for the development of the property for the three 
uses, and there was received in evidence a plan (Ex. D-4) 
showing a plausible development for the entire property. 
(Tr. 154, 267-268, 275, 426) 
The appraisers, FLETCHER and JOHNS, for the 
State, were in basic agreement with the landowner's 
experts as to the highest and best use of the property prior 
to condemnation. (Tr. 623, 770-771) 
The employment of the total property as an integrated 
unit of land, for the varied uses of industrial, commercial 
and housing, rested upon several conditions: 
Access to Industrial . . . the industrial land in the 
north one-third was heavily dependent upon its 
direct access from 2100 South and to a lesser 
degree, a secondary access from Redwood Road. 
(Tr. 146-147, 256-257, 418) FRANCIS SOLOMON 
testified that proper planning of the industrial 
portion required the main entrance be established 
on 2100 South with a series of interior roads 
fanning out inside the property, as illustrated by 
the Frehner Plan. (Tr. 257, 271) Mr. KIEPE 
stated that the dual access from 2100 South and 
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Redwood gave all the Industrial land the advant-
ages of "circulation" which it did not have without 
the 2400 feet of 2100 South access. (Tr. 426-427) 
Access to West One-half . . . the development of the 
west one-half of the land, industrial on the north 
and residential on the south, was conditioned upon 
access being maintained from 2100 South and 
Redwood Road (Ex. D~4), since traffic movement 
and buying interests going to and from the prop-
erty would be from the north and east. (Tr. 177, 
258, 466) There were no public streets on the 
west boundary of the land nor did defendant have 
access to a street system from its west side so that 
if access from the west sections to 2100 South 
and Redwood Road were cut-off or obstructed, the 
remaining access to those sections would be only 
by way of 3100 South, an inferior county road. 
(Tr. 178, 179, 467) 
Drainage of Decker Lake . . . the pond, covering about 
180 acres, had acted as a shallow basin for portions 
of the subject property and lands west as tail 
water drained to the Jordan River. (Tr. 73, 74) 
Although not more than a foot in depth (Tr. 75), 
its existence presented a definite problem in de-
velopment of the 500 plus acres on the southeast 
for residential use. ALTON J. SORENSON of 
Caldwell, Richards and Sorenson, engineers, testi-
fied that since the bottom of the lake was three 
to five feet above the surface elevation of the 
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Jordan River, the lake was susceptible to being 
drained and filled for residential use. (Tr. 78-84) 
Fill material was available on the property west 
of the lake and east of the power line right-of-way 
which could have been graded and compacted in the 
pond area. (Tr. 89-91) Although the cost of drain-
ing and filling the lake was estimated as 
substantial, it was feasible, from both engineering 
and economic standpoints, before the "taking," 
because the total 500 acres developed under one 
ownership and as a unit, was large enough to 
absorb the costs as a part of general land pre-
paration expenses. (Tr. 88, 145-146, 279, 424-425) 
The stage was thus set on the property at the time 
the State filed its condemnation complaint. 
2. Nature and Design of "Taking" 
The 78 acre acquisition courses the full breadth of the 
property from north to south cutting through the middle 
of the industrial and residential land (Ex. 1, Tr. 15, 466-
468, 473), with the result that the remaining property is 
literally broken in two pieces. (Tr. 180, 466-468, 473, 474) 
The freeway right-of-way lines, throughout, are designated 
as "non-access." (See Appx. 6) The dual effects of 
this "non-access" design are not only that the Defendant 
is prohibited from access to the freeway from its remaining 
lands at all points along the "taking",1 but also that there 
1The only access which the Defendant-landowners have or will 
have to 1-215 upon its completion is that which it will share with 
others in common as members of the general public. (Tr. 13, 14, 16) 
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is no means or way afforded to the Defendant to cross 
the freeway from one side of its remaining property to the 
other. (Tr. 16) The blocking of east-west travel on the 
property is complete under the freeway design for there 
is no interchange or grade separation device permitting 
access from west to east within the property for a distance 
of 8000 feet. (Tr. 15) 
The 2400 feet of frontage of and access to the Defend-
ant's land on 2100 South Street is taken in its entirety. 
(Tr. 13, 177, Ex. D-1C) 
The width of the freeway "taking" averages 260 feet 
through the south, center and north center of the property 
(Tr. 8), but increases to a final width of 2400 feet at the 
north end. (Tr. 9, Ex. D-l) 
As finally constructed, the traveled portions of the 
freeway will be elevated on an 8 foot dirt fill, on an average, 
(Tr. 18) with the height of the dirt fill gradually increasing 
on a 2% grade at both the north and south ends of the 
property to an elevation between 22 and 35 feet in order 
that the freeway may pass over 2100 South and 3100 South 
Streets. (Tr. 7, 18, 19) 
3. Remaining Property AFTER the "Taking" 
By reason of the "taking" and the design of the high-
way project across subject property, the land left to this 
Defendant after condemnation was subject to a set of new 
conditions which did not previously exist. In determining 
the highest and best use and fair market value of the 
property remaining after the "taking", the expert witnesses 
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called by the landowner, testified that the buyer and seller 
in the open market would take stock of the following 
factors: 
(a) After the "taking", the remnant property con-
sisted of two separated pieces, isolated from each 
other. (Tr. 184, 186-188, 319, 473-77) Whereas 
before the expropriation, the buyer in the market 
had the advantage of developing one unit of ground 
for its highest use with the costs of such spread 
over the whole property, the severed tracts after 
the "taking" were each on its own to develop with-
out the aid of the other or of the whole. (Tr. 186-88, 
473-77) From one unified tract of ground, the 
highway had created two unhomogenous re-
mainders. (Tr. 177-186, 310-20, 465-80) 
(b) Gone were the advantages of the control of access 
to and through the total property, gone was the 
flexibility in the manner and variations of develop-
ment, gone was the beneficial influence which 
development of the east portion of the ground 
would have on the west part, and gone was the 
plottage, the uniform shape, and the access char-
acteristics which the property formerly possessed. 
(Tr. 176-186, 314-320, 465-479) WERNER KIEPE 
was of the opinion that the "'taking" through the 
middle of the total property produced a cutting 
effect that, in a general way, innured to the derti-
ment of practically all the remainder land. (Tr. 
467) 
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(c) For a span of 10 city blocks, the freeway was to be 
constructed over Defendant's land without a single 
crossing point or underpass. (Tr. 15, 16) Prior to 
condemnation, the crossing from the east to the 
west parts of the land, or vice-versa, involved 
the travel of but a few steps. (Ex. D-l) To 
reach the same place after condemnation from a 
point on the opposite side of the freeway, travel 
exceeding 10,000 feet or 16 city blocks was required 
down the length of the property south to 3100 
South Street, along that street underneath the 
freeway overpass, and back again the length of 
the land. (Tr. 15-17) 
(d) Industrial Land Remaining East of Freeway. All 
access to this property (72.6 acres) from 2100 
South Street was lost as a consequence of the 
"taking". (Tr. 13, 177, 466, D-1C) Mr. SOLOMON 
testified that said property was reduced to re-
liance on Redwood Road for its access, which 
street had not theretofore generated industrial 
influence south of 2100 South. (Tr. 312, 344) 
It had also been deprived of its probable poten-
tial development as part of the larger industrial 
tract according to Solomon. (Ex. D-4, Tr. 344-345) 
Now situated in a pocket next to the freeway, it 
would be dependent for development from the east 
instead of from the industrial area of the north. 
(Tr. 188, 466, 311-312) 
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(e) Industrial Land Remaining West of Freeway. The 
loss of access to the industrial land on the east 
of the freeway was also occasioned to the 122 ±. 
acres of industrial land on the west. Ingress and 
egress to that land after condemnation, had to 
come from a pole line road (a dead-end dirt road, 
the public nature of which was highly questioned), 
or from 3100 South Street (some 7 to 8 city blocks 
away). (Tr. 177-79, 313, 467, 468) SOLOMON 
concluded that the loss of reasonable access, the in-
creased expenses in utility development and a delay 
in time in which the property would have other-
wise developed, all but "disrupted" the former in-
dustrial use concept of this remainder. (Tr. 312-
315) Additionally, available materials needed to 
fill low spots on such property had been "taken" 
or isolated by the freeway. (Tr. 314) KIEPE 
described the 52 acres in the pocket between the 
freeway and the power line on the west as being 
"shut-off" from access and development until the 
Defendant bought land to the north to reestab-
lish a connection with frontage on 2100 South. 
(Tr. 467) 
(f) Commercial Acreage East of Freeway. A pene-
trating analysis of the commercial land fronting 
on Redwood Road was made by WERNER KIEPE. 
He investigated more comparable commercial sales 
data -than all (other expert witnesses for both 
sides, combined. (Tr. 447-457, 640, 782) The 
commercial value accorded to this 39.8 acres by 
KIEPE prior to the "taking" was premised on 
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the fact that this parcel was "an ideal location 
for a shopping center", to serve the interior resi-
dential land of Defendant as well as residential 
areas, generally, to the south and west. (Tr. 429, 
471, 472) After the "taking" and construction 
of the freeway, the accessibility to the commercial 
area from lands west of the Belt Route, including 
that remaining to Defendant, is "completely shut 
off except by a long circuitous road" with the 
end result that the shopping center would "lose 
most of its potential buyers" from that area, 
(Tr. 472, 473) 
(g) Residential Land East of Freetvay. The circum-
stances visited on this remainder (constituting 
some 209 acres) were described by Messrs. SOLO-
MON and KIEPE. SOLOMON stated that be-
cause the Belt Route was not planned for con-
struction until 1968, the development of this land 
would be delayed, which delay, expressed in loss 
of return on the investment to the buyer, would 
have a depreciating affect to a 300 foot strip, or 
about 45 acres of land paralleling the freeway. 
(Tr. 316, 317) Furthermore, because of the prox-
imity to noises, vibrations and odors from free-
way traffic, it would be necessary to add an addi-
tional 50 feet to the depth of residential plottage.2 
2The witness, Solomon, stated and the testimony in the case is 
undisputed that a 50 foot corridor reservation next to a non-access 
freeway is standard practice by landowners in the development of 
residential land. (Tr. 318) Such a corridor reservation was only 
made necessary by the "taking" and construction of the freeway 
through Defendant's land. (Tr. 315, L. 28-30) 
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(Tr. 315-318) Mr. KIEPE was determined to 
the same judgment, i.e., that the residential land 
immediately next to the freeway will require addi-
tional depth in lot development and is less desir-
able in the market place by reason of that fact, 
after condemnation. (Tr. 478, 479) KIEPE also 
found that home site acreage east of the freeway 
had also lost materials for grading, filling of 
Decker Pond, and contouring, which materials 
were in the "taking" or segregated to the west 
by the "taking". (Tr. 477) 
(h) Residential Land West of Freeway. The factors 
of proximity to the freeway and the requirements 
of added depth appurtenant to the residential 
land east, was as well extant on the west of the 
"taking". (Ex. D-9 Solomon, D-10 Kiepe, Tr. 
317, 476-479) Several other depreciating factors 
were also present. A strip of land, approximating 
26 acres, was caught between the west non-access 
line and the east edge of the power line right-of-
way. (See Appx. 6, Ex. D-l) Prior to condem-
nation, the 26 acres was part of the integrated 
west-center section of the total tract. After con-
demnation, it is left as an isolated tract. Begin-
ning on the north at a perpendicular tangent to 
Highway Station 458±, this severed strip grad-
ually narrows in width until reaching a point 
tangent to Station 420-415, it is only a few feet 
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wide. (Tr. 318-319) SOLOMON and KIEPE de-
scribed the pinched sections as "almost useless" 
and damaged to the point that "it practically 
loses its value". (Tr. 318, 476) As in other areas, 
neither witness, FLETCHER or JOHNS, for the 
State found any severance damage whatsoever, 
to this 26 acre area. (Ex. P-12, P-14) The resi-
dential land west of the freeway (about 146 
acres) is, because of the "taking", physically and 
circumstantially divorced from its former envir-
onment and access to and from the east. Loll 
said that because of condemnation, such property 
had lost its "doorway" to the east for develop-
ment of utilities and access. (Tr. 184) FRANCIS 
SOLOMON concluded that the acreage, having 
lost its east-west access, had sustained a set back 
in the time of development amounting to 6.67% 
of the former property value. Mr. Kiepe sum-
med up the matter: 
"A. We now have a definite division. For-
merly, we had nearly 500 acres which was in 
one plot, which could be developed and it meant 
a uniformity of planning of roads and so forth 
which could be — which would allow for a 
much better development. Now, this part will 
have to be developed separately. That is the 
west part will have to be developed separately 
from the east part. There can not be any con-
tinuity there." (Tr. 474-475) 
(i) Sewer and Water. In the development of the sep-
arated tracts west and east of the freeway after 
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condemnation, the costs of installing sewer and 
water underneath the highway right-of-way is 
measurably increased as against the expense in-
cident to development of the integrated property 
before the "taking". (Tr. 94-96) 
Each of the witnesses, SOLOMON, KIEPE, and LOLL, 
called by Defendant, translated the foregoing factors (a) 
through (i) into that price which the willing buyer would 
pay the willing seller for the remainder property after 
condemnation. (Ex. D-6, D-9, D-10) Expressed in sev-
erance damage and apart from the value of the "taking", 
they individually concluded that the buyer will pay less 
to the seller for the remaining property after condemnation 
than would have been paid for the same property before 




4. Land Value Witnesses for the State. The condemnor's 
first witness, R. S. FLETCHER, gave testimony that there 
was absolutely no severance damage to the remaining prop-
perty as a result of the "taking" and the construction of 
the non-access freeway through the Defendant's property. 
(Ex. P-14, Tr. 666) On cross-examination, he admitted: 
that he had made no investigation as to the cost or 
feasibility in draining and filling Decker Pond, 
although it is a factor as to which the buyer and 
seller ought to be informed; (Tr. 702-708) 
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that the costs of draining and filling could have been 
averaged over the total residential acreage before 
the "taking" as against the inability to do so 
because of physical separation after condemna-
tion; (Tr. 710) 
that he knew of no other property nor had he ap-
praised any other property in Salt Lake County 
wherein a non-access freeway had cut through 
a total property for 10 city blocks with no place 
to get from one side of the remainder to the 
other; (Tr. 712) 
that if the highway "taking" had permitted full access 
to the landowner from one side to the other of 
his remaining property, his appraisal of sever-
ance damage would have been the same as it was 
here. IN OTHER WORDS, HE FOUND NO 
SEVERANCE DAMAGE TO THE REMNANT 
PARCELS IN ITS TOTAL LOSS OF EAST-
WEST ACCESS FOR A DISTANCE OF 8,000 
LINEAR FEET; (Tr. 712-714) 
that there was no damage to the remaining industrial 
land either west or east of the freeway, although 
it had lost 2400 feet of frontage and access on 
2100 South, although it had lost its flexibility 
for development, although one piece was left as 
an isolated 4 acre tract, and although better than 
140 acres west of the freeway would have to de-
pend upon access, if at all, by a pole line road; 
(Tr. 721-726) 
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that there was no severance damage to the industrial 
land remaining on the west side, even though 46 
acres of it would, admittedly, be "possibly" de-
layed a year in development because of the "tak-
ing". (Tr. 727) A delay of one year in loss of 
interest on the investment to the buyer in the 
market was calculated by the witness to be $13,-
800.00; (Tr. 727) 
that the narrow strip of land in the residential section 
physically severed between the west freeway non-
access line and the power line was worth just as 
much "after" as it was "before", although the 
piece tapers to a single point on the south tip 
where for several hundred feet, its width is less 
than 25 feet; (Tr. 731) 
that so far as severance damage is concerned, he did 
not give any consideration to the time in which 
the freeway would be built in determining whether 
the remainder lands had been delayed in devel-
opment by the manner and time of highway con-
struction. (Tr. 732) 
Fletcher was evasive and unresponsive on cross-examina-
tion and the trial Court found it necessary to admonish 
him on several occasions: 
"You are not an advocate and you are a witness 
and your responsibility is to answer the question 
as simply as you can." (Tr. 698) 
"Mr. Fletcher, I don't know why you are re-
luctant to answer questions. You ought to answer 
the questions as put to you in fairness. You ought 
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to answer yes or no not to presume to begin a dis-
cussion of something else. Do you understand? 
(Tr. 756) 
A.B.C. JOHNS, JR. was the condemnor's last value wit-
ness. His opinion of market value, both "before" and 
"after" condemnation, was substantially less than that of 
other witnesses, the other government witness, Fletcher, 
included. (Ex. P-12, P-14, D-6, D-9, D-10) JOHNS' value 
of the total tract before the "taking" was $441,029.00 less 
than FLETCHER, $560,885.00 less than the market value 
determined by FRANCIS SOLOMON, and $1,007,329.00 
less than the judgment of WERNER KIEPE. (Ibid.) The 
segments of JOHNS' testimony significant to this Appeal 
are: 
under his opinion, the best of Defendant's land prior 
to the "take" was that at the extreme north having 
direct access to 2100 South Street. It had a value 
of $4,000 per acre by his testimony. Only 69± 
of 233 industrial acres was given that value; 
(Tr. 800) 
the witness admitted that the remaining property had 
suffered in the loss of all access of 2100 South 
Street by the closing of east-west access through-
out the remainder land and by its increased 
dependency for ingress and egress upon Redwood 
Road on the west and the pole line road on the 
east, all of which JOHNS acknowledged would be 
important considerations to the buyer and seller 
in the market. (Tr. 830-832) But he opined that 
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there was no diminution in value to any of the 
remainder lands attributable to those factors, 
with the exception of 25 acres; (Tr. 813-814) 
even if the condemnor had constructed underpasses 
on the property allowing east-west travel under 
the freeway instead of the total blocking of such 
travel as actually established, the remaining prop-
erty would have the same market value under 
either design in JOHNS' view of things; (Tr. 856) 
he admitted that Decker Lake area would be much the 
more difficult to develop after the "taking" be-
cause there was less land with which to work and 
over which to spread the costs, and further ad-
mitted that the buyer and seller would count it 
as a detriment to the "after" value of the re-
mainder, but he didn't "reflect it" in his "after" 
opinion; (Tr. 838) 
JOHNS found no depreciation in the value of the resi-
dential grounds remaining, east or west of the 
freeway, although he too acknowledged that such 
remainders must develop as separate units, that 26 
acres on the west was pressed between the free-
way and the power line, and that the west area, 
generally, was now dependent on a new neighbor-
hood to the south; (Tr. 854-855) 
the witness allowed that the lone damage to remainder 
properties caused by the "taking" was restricted 
to 25 acres of $4,000 industrial land. (Tr. 813) 
Reason for the depreciation — loss of access to 
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2100 South. The damage amounted to 40%; (Tr. 
813, Ex. P-12) 
the other remainder industrial lands immediately abut-
ting on the damaged 25 acres sustained the iden-
tial loss of 2100 South Street access, it was con-
ceded by JOHNS, but he conceded no severance 
damage to any part of the same; (Tr. 851-854) 
59% of the witness' severance damage was promptly 
erased when he disclosed that in his view, the 
same 25 acres which he had damaged $1,700 per 
acre, along with an additional 21 ± acres west of 
the "taking", had been specially benefitted $575 
per acre in the total sum of $26,582.00. (Tr. 815) 
The basis claimed for the benefits was the loca-
tion of the 1-215 freeway interchange at 2100 
South Street. JOHNS said on direct examination 
that he considered sales of other lands similarly 
benefitted (Tr. 816), but he could not on cross-
examination relate one such transaction; (Tr. 864, 
865) 
JOHNS admitted to changing his original appraisal 
before trial to include the $26,582.00 special bene-
fits. Before that, his appraisal had not included 
any special benefits whatsoever. (Tr. 862) 
5. Cross-examination of JOHArS on Condas Property. On 
cross-examination, the condemnor's witness, JOHNS, ad-
mitted that he had previously appraised in behalf of a land-
owner, the "Condas property" next door to the subject prop-
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erty on the north and east. It had been acquired for high-
way purposes also. (Tr. 828, 842) The Condas piece had ac-
cess on 2100 South Street and Redwood Road as did the 
subject property, and was zoned industrial M-l as was the 
industrial land of defendant. (Tr. 828) Counsel for De-
fendant proceeded to ask JOHNS whether, in fact, he had 
in the past "appraised the Condas piece for the landowner 
for $10,000 per acre." (Tr. 843) The objection by State's 
counsel on the ground of immateriality was sustained and 
Court advised the jury: 
"jury is admonished to disregard the testimony 
with respect to the price of the adjoining property 
and I might make this explanation, that is, while 
inquiry with respect on cross-examination of factors 
considered in nearby areas is a proper exercise of 
cross, it is the Court's judgment that in this in-
stance that the value of that is out-weighed by the 
risks that are involved in introducing other issues 
which we do not have the time to resolve. 
We are not about to re-try that case or the fac-
tors involved there, so, for that reason I ask you 
to disregard that testimony and that question com-
pletely." (Tr. 843, 844) 
The trial judge expressed anxiety about time throughout 
the JOHNS' cross-examination. (Tr. 842, 844, 853, 861, 
864) 
6. Special Benefits to Remainder by JOHNS. On direct 
examination, JOHNS said that 46 acres of the industrial 
remainder were benefitted specially because of the arterial 
interchange and traffic to be established on the freeway 
north of the subject land after the "taking". The witness 
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did not testify that the highest and best use of the bene-
fitted property was enhanced. (Tr. 815, 864) On cross 
examination, counsel for Defendant asked the witness if 
it were not true that the traffic which would be placed on 
and through the interchange area was the same traffic 
that was already passing the subject property on Redwood 
Road. (Tr. 864) The State's objection of immateriality 
was sustained. (Tr. 864) 
7. Qualifications of Expert Witnesses 
Witnesses for Defendant-landowner: 
C. FRANCIS SOLOMON has been a broker and ap-
praiser in Salt Lake City for 37 years. A senior 
member of the American Institute of Real Estate 
Appraisers (M A I), he was President of the 
Utah Chapter, is on its National Board of Gov-
ernors, was Southwest Regional Conference Di-
rector and in 1963, was the National President 
of the Institute. He is a member of and has served 
as president of Utah Association of Realtors, and 
the Society of Residential Appraisers, and is a 
member of the American Right of Way Associa-
tion. He has sub-divided and developed residential 
land. He has been a lecturer on real estate at 
several Universities in the west and an author 
of portion of a manual on Appraisal Techniques 
published by Prentice-Hall, Inc. He was desig-
nated the first "Realtor of the Year" for Utah in 
1961. On constant retainment by the State Road 
Commission during the past decade, his clientel 
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lists every substantial public agency, federal, state, 
county, city, school board, in Utah engaged in land 
acquisition, as well as Zions, Walker, First Secur-
ity, Continental Banks, Pioneer Savings, Ameri-
can and Prudential Savings, all types of insur-
ance companies and mortgage institutions, 
churches, oil companies and private individuals. 
(Tr. 243-254) 
WERNER KIEPE — 28 years a broker and appraiser 
in Utah. He is the senior member in Utah and 
past chapter president of the American Institute 
( M A I ) , qualifying as a member in 1937. With a 
degree in Economics and Accounting from the 
University of Utah, Mr. Kiepe is professor of the 
real estate course of the University under joint 
sponsorship with the M A I group. Past president 
of the Utah Board of Realtors, he prepared for the 
State Tax Commission the tables for the uniform 
tax assessment of real property now in use by 
that Agency and Salt Lake County. Like Mr. 
SOLOMON, the witness has appraised and testi-
fied in behalf of the State Road Commission con-
sistently in years past on highway expropriations, 
as well as in behalf of every major governmental 
agency in the Salt Lake County, all major banks, 
churches, mortgage institutions, oil companies and 
others. (Tr. 398-409) 
Both Messers. SOLOMON AND KIEPE appraised 
the lands in the condemnation cases involving 
"This is the Place Monument". (Tr. 252, 409) 
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MAXWELL LOLL — A broker and appraiser, Loll 
has been active in the real estate market since 
1946. A member of the American Society of Ap-
praisers ( A S A ) and American Right of Way 
Association, he has taken a variety of special 
appraisal courses. He has been retained by the 
State Road Commission more than any other 
single client. Loll had appraised on every section 
of interstate highway in Salt Lake County for 
the Road Commission, including land immediately 
abutting the subject property north and south 
on 1-215, and east on the 2100 South Expressway. 
Over 60 appraisals had been made for the Road 
Commission in 1965, alone, on Salt Lake County 
freeways by Mr. Loll. He had also appraised for 
other condemnors in Salt Lake County, banks and 
private landowners. (Tr. 131-138) 
Witnesses for Plaintiff-condemnor: 
R. S. FLETCHER — A broker since 1958 and a recent 
member of the American Insitute (M A I ) , 
Fletcher has been in the real estate business since 
1947. Only recently has he appraised for public 
agencys involved in land acquisition. He has ap-
praised for banks, insurance companies and pri-
vate individuals. (Tr. 603-608) 
A. B. C. JOHNS, JR. — A private fee appraiser since 
1962, Johns was not and had never been a broker. 
A graduate of University of Houston in 1949, he 
had been a member of the M I A group for 3 
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years. He also was a member of the Society of 
Real Estate Appraisers. He had served as an ap-
praiser for the Federal Bureau of Public Roads to 
investigate and inspect federal-aid land purchases 
made by the State Road Commission in 1962. 
He had appraised for one other federal agency, 
no other public agencies except the Road Com-
mission, some insurance companies and private 
owners. (Tr. 760-764, 882, 823) 
8. Acreage Values and Comparable Sales of Witnesses. 
The main points of contest on market value before the "tak-
ing'', were in the industrial section of the north (233± 
acres) and the residential area of the center, southeast and 
west (466dz acres) of the total tract. (Exs. D-6, D-9, D-
10, P-12, P-14; see Appendices 1 thru 5 herein.) In sum-
mary, the opinions of the witnesses in those areas were: 
Industrial Residential 
Appraiser Per Acre Per Acre 
Mr. SOLOMON* $5,500-$4,235 $3,500-$2,328 
Mr. KIEPE* $6,500-$4,000 $1,650 
Mr. LOLL $5,500 $3,000 
Mr. FLETCHER* $6,000-$5,000 $l,500-$200 
Mr. JOHNS, JR.* $4,000-$2,300 $177 
Sales of comparable properties utilized by the wit-
nesses for Defendant were probative and the more relevant 
to the subject property:** 
^Values on the acreage varied depending upon particular location. 
**A complete compilation of sales data will be found on Exhibits D-13, 
13A, 13B, 13C and P- l l and in the direct examination of each wit-
ness. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 












2100 So. 2350 West 
(across street from 
subject) 
2100 So. 2100 West 
(across street from 
subject) 
2100 So. 1850 West 
(across street from 
subject) 
2100 So. 2700 West 








2100 So. 2700 West 36 
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The sales used by State witnesses were, for the most 
part, westerly of the subject property, some more than 10 
blocks away. (Ex. P- l l ) In all, witnesses for the Defen-
dant produced 27 seperate transactions, and the Plaintiff's 
witnesses testified to 18. (Ex. D-13 et al., P - l l ) 
9. Market Value Opinions of Witnesses. The witness 
calculations on market value before and after the "taking" 
are lengthy and need not be fully reproduced here. They 
are set forth in the Appendices 1-5 of this Brief. In capsule 
form they were: (Exs. D-6, D-9, D-10, P-12, P-14) 
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For the Defendant-landowner 
C. FRANCIS SOLOMON 
Value of total tract BEFORE..$3,169,651.00 
Value of remainder tract 
AFTER $2,609,766.00 
Difference or Just Compensation $560,000.00 
WERNER KIEPE 
Value of total tract BEFORE..$3,448,920.00 
Value of remainder tract 
AFTER $2,773,750.00 
Difference or Just Compensation $675,170.00 
MAXWELL LOLL 
Value of total tract BEFORE..$3,516,590.00 
Value of remainder tract 
AFTER $2,844,070.00 
Difference or Just Compensation $672,520.00 
For Plaintiff-condemnor 
R. S. FLETCHER 
Value of total tract BEFORE..$2,882,620.00 
Value of remainder tract 
AFTER $2,550,500.00 
Difference or Just Compensation $332,120.00 
A.B.C. JOHNS, JR. 
Value of total tract BEFORE..$2,441,591.00 
Value of remainder tract 
AFTER $2,187,914.00 
Difference or Just Compensation $253,677.00 
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10. Instructions of Court 
The Court by 3 separate Instructions, 18, 19, 30, charged 
the jury that the Defendant had the burden of proving the 
market value of land "taken" and damages by the prepon-
derance of the evidence. In Instruction 18, it directed that: 
"If the evidence introduced by both parties as to 
the land taken and damages, if any, to the remain-
ing lands is evenly balanced, then you will reject 
the contentions advanced by the Defendants." (Em-
phasis added.) 
Nowhere did the Court charge the jury that its verdict 
could be within the range of the total value testimony, if 
the preponderance was less than the value conclusions of 
the landowner but more than the Government's testimony. 
11. Special Interrogatories Returned by the Jury 
The jury returned into open court the following inter-
rogatories submitted under Instruction No. 30: 
1. As of July 12, 1965, what is the fair 
market value of the 926.7 acres — be-
fore condemnation. 
Answer $2,775,911.00 
2. As of July 12, 1965, what is the fair 
market value of the remaining 848.59 
acres — after condemnation of the 
78.11 acres by the State and the con-
struction of the freeway in the man-
ner proposed. This figure should in-
clude such benefits, if any, which you 
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find the new highway facility may 
bring. 
Answer $2,416,034.00 
3. The difference between 1 and 2 is the 
just compensation to the landowner. 
Answer _..$ 359,877.00 
4. What is the fair market value of the 
78.11 acres condemned by the State as 
of July 12, 1965. 
Answer $ 308,301.00 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING 
THE DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL ON THE 
BASIS OF INADEQUATE DAMAGES. 
The jury interrogatories are against the clear and 
manifest weight of the creditable testimony and 
are unsupported by the substantial and believable 
evidence. 
After return of the jury interrogatories and entry of 
judgment, Defendant pursuant to Rule 59(a) (5) U.R.C.P., 
moved the lower Court for a new trial or in the alternative, 
an additur to the verdict. One of the bases was that the 
interrogatories as answered and returned were so grossly 
inadequate and openly contrary to the preponderance of 
the believable testimony on market value, both before and 
after the "taking", that it shocked the basic senses of jus-
tice and fairness of the Court, and required a new trial on 
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the question of Just Compensation. The trial judge refused 
to grant the motion. He was wrong in so doing. 
In seeking a new trial on the ground of inadequacy of 
the condemnation award, Defendant's counsel is not un-
mindful of the prevailing rule that this Court will not re-
view the facts of this case de novo, Art. VIII Sec. 9, Utah 
Constitution, nor will it set aside a jury verdict and judg-
ment because a simple preponderance of the evidence would 
suggest a different solution. Horsley v. Robinson, et al., 
112 Utah 227, 186 P. 2d 592 (1947). The test is whether 
in the minds of reasonable men, the award is "obviously" 
below "any reasonable appraisal of the damages suffered". 
Opinions of Crockett, J. and Henriod, J. in Stamp v. Union 
Pacific R. R. Co., 5 U. 2d 397, 303 P. 2d 279 (1956). To be 
upheld in law, the verdict and judgment must: 
"fall within that orbit so that it can be said that 
there is substantial evidence from which reasonable 
minds could believe facts which will support it." 
(Emphasis ours) Lund V. Phillips Petroleum Com-
pany, 10 U. 2d 276, 351 P. 2d 953 (1960). 
The principle was applied to actions in eminent domain in 
City of Winchester V. Ring, 312 111. 544, 144 N. E. 333 
(1924), wherein the Illinois Supreme Court said: 
"The rule is that this court will not interfere with 
the finding of a jury on the question of damages in 
a case of this character unless that finding is clearly 
and palpably against the weight of the evidence." 
There is good reason for the rule that an appellate 
court will set aside a jury award with reluctance. Penman V. 
Eimco Corp., 144 Utah 6, 196 P. 2d 984 (1948); Stamp V. 
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Union Pacific R. R. Co., supra. But when that award falls 
short, as it does in the case at Bar, of any reasonable as-
sessment of compensation for the "taking" and damages 
to the remainder, the injustice will be rectified on appeal. 
Kentucky Highivay Coram. v. Gilbert, 253 S. W. 2d 264 (Ky. 
1952). As declared by this Court in Bodon V. Suhrmann, 
8 U. 2d 42, 327 P. 2d 826 (1958) : 
"when the verdict is outside the limits of any rea-
sonable appraisal of damages as shown by the evi-
dence, it should not be permitted to stand, and if 
the trial court fails to rectify it, we are obliged to 
make the correction on appeal." 
See also 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain 110, Sec. 17.3 (3rd 
Ed.). 
Employing these law principles to the rudiments of 
the subject case, when consideration is given to the testi-
mony of the believable witnesses on market value, SOLO-
MON and KIEPE, to the foundation for their appraisals, 
to their professional background and experience in making 
value judgments of this magnitude, to their ability to per-
ceive the rationale of those elements commonly noticed in 
the buying market, and to the overwhelming evidence of 
remainder damages under their testimony, when weighed 
against the deficiencies of FLETCHER and JOHNS, their 
lack of experience, their failure to reflect factors in their 
evaluations which they acknowledged time after time 
were of vital import to the remainder properties, their al-
most consistent attitude of ignoring the most conspicuous 
elements of severance damages and their lack of candor 
on the witness stand, all culminate in the plain conclusion 
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in the minds of reasonable men that the award in this mat-
ter, under the interrogatories of the jury, is so pitifully in-
adequate as to transcend and shock the ordinary senses of 
justice and common sense. The record of trial herein, puts 
the rule in Bodon into effect. 
Such conclusion does not depend upon argument of 
counsel. The facts and the witnesses provide the answer. 
While the expropriation of the 78 acres by the State con-
sumed about 8% of the total tract, it was not that fact 
which wrecked havoc to the remaining lands. Rather, it 
was the location of the "taking" and the non-access design 
of the highway project which brought about the ruination 
of the remnant parcels. The right of the citizen to recover 
for both elements stems from constitutional and statutory 
guarantees. Article I. Sec. 22 Utah Constitution; 78-34-10-
(2) U.C.A. 1953; State Road Comm. V. Co-op Security 
Corp. of LDS Church, 122 Utah 134, 247 P. 2d 269 (1952); 
Tanner V. Provo Bench Canal & Irr. Co., 40 Utah 105, 121 
Pac. 584 (1911). 
The testimony is without dispute that the action of the 
Federal Bureau of Roads and the Road Commission in this 
case has no practical parallel in the history of Salt Lake 
County. For under the Complaint, the "taking" will serve 
to construct a non-access elevated freeway through the 
heart of 928 acres of industrial and residential land for a 
span of 10 city blocks (i.e. from South Temple to Tenth 
South) without a solitary crossing for the remaining land-
owner. Had the "taking" occurred on the far west or ex-
* treme east of the total property, or had the Plaintiff per-
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mitted or established some way for the Defendant-land-
owner to get on and off the highway facility, or at least to 
cross it at distant intervals, the consequences would not 
have been so grievous. But neither happened. Like a hack 
saw, the "taking" cuts and tears through the center-axis 
of the land creating perpetual severance as it goes, until 
reaching the north end, it renders up the very guts of the 
property by engulfing all 2400 feet of frontage and access 
on 2100 South. 
The aftermath of the "taking" is mostly deductive. 
The property is forever shorn of its integrity as one unit of 
land with the auxiliary advantages of flexible development, 
utility location, interior access control, and the appreciation 
in parts of the land as a consequence of developing other 
parts. The effective access to the industrial land and the 
west residential land is emasculated by loss of all 2100 
South access in the expropriation. The property is left with 
side and rear doors only. SOLOMON and KIEPE were 
specific in their judgment of the damage from the depriva-
tion of access. Two pieces of the remainder land (4 acres 
formerly industrial on the east of the "take" and 26 acres 
of residential on the west) are injured to the point that 
their entire use has been changed. There is no possible way 
to develop them "after" as "before". The residential land 
west of the freeway, whereas "before" appurtenant to the 
whole, is "after" in a cell, a new neighborhood, and obliged 
to sell as a segregated parcel. And the Decker Pond area, 
previously susceptible to being drained, filled and developed 
only because it was an integral part of the total residential 
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area, is divorced forever from over 170 acres to the west, 
which would have otherwise benefitted by the improvement 
of the pond and would have withstood some of the develop-
ment costs. And on further the sterilizing affects of the 
"taking" were extended, viz., proximity to the freeway, 
noise, odors, and a 3 to 4 year delay in construction of the 
roadway. 
The balance of the aftermath of the "taking" is axio-
matic : the willing buyer, informed as we assume he is on 
the disadvantages of the remainder lands described-above 
and as set out unequivocally in the testimony at trial, simply 
would not begin to pay that price, after condemnation, for 
the isolated tracts in their then condition as he would have 
paid for the same ground, before condemnation, when the 
land was all one unit. Therein lies one of the three keys to 
the inadequate condemnation award, upon which a new 
trial is herein urged. 
By calculation and deduction from the interrogatories 
returned, the jury found that the remaining 848 acres had 
had been damaged $41,576.00.3 In terms of the jury's own 
interrogatories, the Defendant's remaining land was dam-
aged but two percent of its former value as a result of the 
"taking" and the construction of the freeway as contem-
plated.4 Such a finding is unworthy of belief, as a matter 
of fundamental justice and law. 
3Under Interrogatory 4, value of land "taken" was answered $318,-
301.00. The total award under Interrogatory 3 (difference of "be-
fore" & "after") was $359,877.00. Difference between 3 and 4, or 
$41,576.00, is severance damage. 
4$41,576.00 is approximately 2% of the "before" value of the total 
tract, less the value attributable to the land actually "taken". 
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That finding of severance damage was less by $210,-
135.00 the judgment of FRANCIS SOLOMON and $267,-
544.00 less than the opinion of WERNER KIEPE on dam-
age and injury to the remainder tracts. Such finding is 
$23,975.00 above the opinion of the State witness, A.B.C. 
JOHNS, allowing an off-set for special benefits which he 
alleged. Without the benefits deducted, the jury finding on 
severance damage is $2,607.00 less than JOHNS. (See Point 
III of this Brief.) Of course, State witness FLETCHER 
said that the remaining land was equally valuable "after" 
as it was "before" the "taking", i.e., no severance damage. 
The second key in this Point on Appeal centers on In-
terrogatories 1, 2 and 3 answered by the jury on the mar-
ket value of the property "before" and "after" the "taking" 
(R. 53), and the testimony of the leading witnesses on the 
same factors. 
Interrogatory 1 asked as to the market value of the 
total tract before the "taking". It was returned in the sum 
of $2,775,911.00 by the jury. It was on this interrogatory 
that all other interrogatories depended. That answer was 
not only $393,740.00 below the informed judgment of C. 
FRANCIS SOLOMON ("before" value — $3,169,651.00) 
and $673,009.00 lower than that of WERNER KIEPE ("be-
fore" value — $3,448,920.00) on the market value of the 
total tract prior to condemnation, BUT IT WAS IN FACT, 
$106,709.00 BELOW THAT OPINION OF THE STATE 
WITNESS, FLETCHER ("before" value — $2,882,620.00). 
There was only one value witness whose opinion prevented 
the answer to Interrogatory 1 from being completely with-
out the scope of all testimony, much less believable testi-
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mony, and that was A.B.C. JOHNS, JR. ("before" value — 
$2,441,591.00). And JOHNS is the witness, who on the 
"before" value of the total tract, was 40% to 80% lower 
on his industrial values than any of the other 4 experts, and 
800% to 1100% lower than any others on the residential 
section of the remainder, through which the "taking" 
courses. (See table on page 26 of this Brief; Appx. 1-5.) 
His opinion on the market value of that residential area 
was $177.00 per acre, a conclusion so incredulous that it 
offends and violates all rational thought. Yet without 
JOHNS, the answer to Interrogatory 1 would be contrary 
to law. Weber Basin Conservancy Dist. v. Moore, 2 U. 2d 
254,272 P. 2d 176 (1954). 
The third key that the award was grossly inadequate 
is Interrogatory 3, defined by the trial Court to be Just 
Compensation in the case, and answered by the jury in the 
sum of $359,877.00. That answer, which is the inadequate 
award, is precisely 
$200,123.00 less than the judgment of Mr. SOLO-
MON, the lowest witness for the Defendant, 
and 
$315,293.00 lower than the judgment of Mr. 
KIEPE. 
The answer was $27,757.00 above the high witness for the 
State, FLETCHER (who did not have any severance dam-
age), and as stated, $200,123.00 below the lowest witness 
for the landowner. 
But what of the witnesses and the weight to be reason-
ably accorded their testimony. SOLOMON and KIEPE 
stand heads and shoulders above all other witnesses in this 
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suit, particularly A.B.C. JOHNS, JR. Engaged in appraisal 
practice in Salt Lake County for more than 25 years, Solo-
mon 37 years, they are the two most notable appraisers in 
the State. Their work over the past decades, the bulk of it 
for condemning agencies and a substantial part of it for the 
State Road Commission, itself, has involved the most com-
plicated and significant land condemnation suits in the 
State. The background, experience, training, seasoning, 
clientele, work as university lecturers, publication writing, 
and the professional activities of Mr. SOLOMON and Mr. 
KIEPE, are completely mismatched when stacked against 
the paucity of qualifications of Mr. JOHNS, upon whose 
opinion the award in this case hangs. 
A member of the M A I association and in practice 
as an appraiser for 3 years, JOHNS named the State Road 
Commission as his primary client (Tr. 760-764). His in-
eptness and lack of experience were borne out by his lack of 
judgment on the value of the total tract "before". Again 
and again on cross examination, his typed answer was that 
although a certain factor could be detrimental to the re-
mainder lands and would be considered by the informed 
buyer and seller, he was not going to recognize it in his ap-
praisal. He was a first rate advocate in the suit. To say 
that the award herein is based on the testimony of A.B.C. 
JOHNS, JR. is to say nothing, because that opinion is so 
frail, absurd and wrought with inconsistencies that it is be-
yond the realm of being worthy of belief. It is insufficient 
to support the award. 
It is these stark facts under the interrogatories of the 
jury (an unsupported and inadequate value of the whole 
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tract before the "taking", severance damage of two per 
cent, and the inferiority of the award) when examined in 
the light of the overwhelming force of the testimony oppos-
ing such results, that brings this case within the frame-
work of Bodon V. Suhrmann, supra, and Lund v. Phillips, 
supra. The award herein is so out of harmony with any 
reasonable assessment of damages and compensation, and 
so shocking to the ordinary sense of fairness and justice, 
to impell the inference that the interrogatories were con-
ceived through gross error, misunderstanding, bias and/or 
prejudice. 
A new trial should be ordered to correct the inade-
quacy and injustice. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY 
IN REFUSING TO PERMIT COUNSEL FOR 
DEFENDANT TO CROSS-EXAMINE T H E 
STATE WITNESS, A.B.C. JOHNS, AS TO HIS 
PRIOR APPRAISAL OF THE CONDAS PROP-
ERTY NEXT DOOR. 
1. It was error to deny cross-examination on the 
Condas appraisal. 
It was in the late stages of the trial, on cross-examina-
tion of the State witness, A.B.C. JOHNS, JR., that the 
lower Court committed reversible error. JOHNS had given 
his opinion on direct examination as to the fair market 
value of the total property before the "taking". (Tr. 800-
804) Part of such opinion included a finding that the in-
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dustrial property of Defendant abutting upon and having 
direct access to 2100 South Street was worth $4,000.00 per 
acre. (Ex. P-14, Appx. 5 herein.) Also, he allowed that 
Defendant's industrial land on Redwood Road would sell for 
$5,200.00 per acre as of the date of "taking". (Ibid.) The 
property of one Condas abutted immediately upon the 
claimed $4,000.00 an acre industrial land on 21st South. 
On cross-examination a foundation was laid and JOHNS 
admitted that the Condas' property abutted on 2100 South, 
that it was zoned the same as subject property, that it was 
adjacent to the Defendant's land prior to condemnation, 
and that he had made a previous appraisal of the Condas 
industrial land for the landowner. (Tr. 828, 842) It was 
abundantly clear at this hour of the trial that the Condas 
property, in terms of location, zoning, size, access and use, 
was much the more comparable than most of the sales data 
upon which JOHNS' testimony was reliant. (Ex. P- l l , Tr. 
775-782.) 
The question was put to the witness by Defendant's 
counsel as to whether on that previous appraisal had he 
not determined the Condas property to be worth $10,000.00 
per acre? 
"MR. CAMPBELL: I have the right, I think, to 
state my question — that you appraised that Condas 
piece for the landmvner for $10,000.00 an acre?" 
An objection was made on grounds of immateriality 
and sustained by the trial judge. In so doing, the Court in-
ferred that he understood the question to ask for the "price" 
paid to the abutting property owner by the State in the 
Condas condemnation proceeding, for it charged the jury 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
that it was to "disregard" the testimony with respect to the 
"price of the abutting property". (Tr. 843) It also admon-
ished the panel that while this question might be a proper 
exercise of cross-examination, the Court was of the judg-
ment that the value of the question was "outweighed by 
the risks . . . involved in introducing other issues" which 
time would not permit. (Tr. 844) 
Two things are pointedly evident in this examination. 
The first is that the question did not ask for the price which 
the State Road Commission had paid for the Condas prop-
erty, it did not ask for the amount of severance damages 
paid to Condas by the State, and it did not ask the price 
which Condas had been offered by the State for his land. 
Each of the foregoing would have been improper and no 
one was better apprised of the same than Defendant's 
counsel. State Road Comm. V. Christensen, 13 U. 2d 224, 
371 P. 2d 552 (1962). But the question did not call for 
such. Rather, it was directed to the appraisal which JOHNS 
had made of the Condas property. It was asked not to es-
tablish market value, but to impeach the credibility and 
consistency of JOHNS' opinion in this case. That fact could 
not be clearer. 
The second thing is that it was error of the trial Court 
to reject the question, for in so doing, it denied to Defen-
dant's counsel a fundamental purpose of cross-examination 
— that of exposing the fraud, the liar, the cheat, the incon-
sistency of a witness and his bias, prejudice and advocacy. 
This Court put the principle well in State of Utah V. Peek, 
1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953), when it held: 
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"There is no other instrument so well adapted 
to discovery of the truth as cross-examination, and 
as long as it tends to disclose the truth, it should 
never be curtailed or limited. Any inquiry should 
be allowed which an individual about to buy would 
feel it in his interests to make." (Emphasis added.) 
There is no tool in the trial process that can be substi-
tuted in place of cross-examination. It is "the detective of 
the court-room". Jensen V. S. H. Kress & Co., 87 Utah 434, 
49 P. 2d 958 (1935). Text authorities on the cross-examina-
tion of an expert witness demonstrate the fallacy of the 
lower Court's ruling in this case: 
"Of course, a witness who expresses an opinion 
as an expert may be impeached by proof that he 
has formerly expressed an opinion which appears to 
be inconsistent with his testimony." Jones on Evi-
dence, Vol. IV, p. 1768, Sec. 939 (5th Ed.). 
Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. I l l , p. 733, Sec. 1041 (3rd Ed.) 
states the rule: 
"All courts, however, concede that expert opin-
ions as well as other opinions ordinarily admissible, 
if inconsistent with those expressed on the stand, 
are receivable." 
Nichols on Eminent Domain, Vol. 5, p. 274, Sec. 18.45(2) 
provides that with respect to the cross-examination of an 
expert witness in an eminent domain trial: 
"The opinion of a witness may be impeached by 
showing that his acts are inconsistent with his 
words, as for example by showing that he has of-
fered the same or similar property for sale at a price 
far different from what he now says it is worth, 
or he may be asked whether he has not made incon-
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sistent statements upon the same point upon other 
occasions. * * * 
"He may be questioned as to his appraisals of 
other property in the area which he has made but 
only if the foundation has been laid for a compari-
son of the different tracts appraised/' (Emphasis 
ours.) 
The case of Bingaman v. City of Seattle, 139 Wash. 68, 
245 Pac. 411 (1926) is clear authority for the rule applic-
able to the cross-examination of JOHNS. Therein, the 
Washington Supreme Court found prejudicial error in the 
refusal to permit cross-examination in a condemnation suit, 
on a prior inconsistent opinion given by the expert witness 
on the value of neighboring land: 
"Of the trial errors assigned necessary to be 
noticed, the first is the contention that the trial 
court too narrowly restricted the cross-examination 
of certain of the city's witnesses. One of them, tes-
tifying to values, had testified in a case between 
other parties in which he had placed values on 
neighgoring property largely in excess of the values 
he placed on the appellant's property. The appellant 
on his cross-examination sought to show this fact, 
but was denied the right so to do by the court. It 
is our opinion the testimony should have been ad-
mitted. There was no great dissimilarity in the sit-
uation or in the condition of the properties, nor was 
the time so remote as to raise a conclusive presump-
tion that there had been any considerable change 
in values. The evidence was thus admissible as 
tending to affect the weight to be given to the wit-
nesses' testimony." (Emphasis added) 
It was held in Contra Costa County v. East Bay Muni-
cipal Dist., 1 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1960) to be proper cross-exam-
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ination of a land expert to permit impeachment on the fact 
"that in another case the expert had expressed a markedly 
different opinion as to the value of comparable property." 
The California Court said: 
'The ruling of the Court was correct. It is 
hornbook law that a witness may be impeached by 
prior inconsistent statements. When an expert gives 
testimony as to the value of land, he states, under 
oath, that his opinion is in fact what he says it is. 
Any experienced trial lawyer knows how difficult 
it is to show, either that it is not in fact his opinion 
or that if it is really his opinion, it is not soundly 
based. It is no doubt for this reason that wide lati-
tude is permitted in cross-examination. 
"If the facts are such that the other property 
can fairly be said to be comparable, and if the dif-
ference in time is not great enough to make the two 
opinions not really inconsistent, the testimony as to 
the witness' own evaluation of the other property is 
clearly within the bounds of proper impeachment" 
(Emphasis ours) 
2. The error committed on the JOHNS' cross-
examination was prejudicial to the Defendant. 
To obtain reversal, it is not enough to show that the 
lower Court erred at some point in the trial. State Road 
Comm. V. Peterson, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76 (1961); 
Hales V. Peterson, 11 U. 2d 411, 360 P. 2d 822 (1961). The 
error must be such that it may have substantially affected 
the outcome of the case. State Road Comm. V. Noble, 6 U. 
2d 40, 305 P. 2d 495 (1957). But such being evidenced, a 
new trial will be ordered. Board of Education v. Bothwell 
& Swaner, 16 U. 2d 341, 400 P. 2d 568 (1965). 
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On the general subject of prejudice ensuing from the 
refusal to permit cross-examination, Harlan Fisk Stone, in 
Alford v. United States, 282 U. S. 687, 75 L. Ed. 625 
(1930), said: 
"Cross-examination of a witness is a matter of 
right. (Citing authorities.) Its permissible pur-
poses, among others, are that facts may be brought 
out tending to discredit the witness by showing that 
his testimony in chief was untrue or biased. (Cit-
ing authorities.) * * * Prejudice ensues from 
a denial of the opportunity to place the witness in 
his proper setting and put the weight of his testi-
mony and his credibility to a test without which the 
jury cannot fully appraise them. (Citing authori-
ties.) " 
In Basch v. Iowa Power and Light Co., 95 N. W. 2d 
714 (Iowa 1959), it was held to be prejudicial error to do 
as the lower Court did in the case at hand, refuse to permit 
cross-examination of an expert witness in a condemnation 
trial on a previous opinion he had expressed as to adjacent 
properties: 
"The sustaining of the objection to the other 
three questions ivas reversible error. By so ruling 
the court denied defendant the right to show prior 
inconsistent statements and actions of the witness 
which would bear directly on the weight and credit 
to be given to his testimony in chief. This court in 
State v. Matheson, 130 Iowa 440, at page 448, 103 
N. W. 137, at page 140, states the rule as follows : 
" 'But the great weight of authority seems 
to support the proposition that if there is an 
inconsistency between the belief of the witness, 
as indicated by his previous declarations, and 
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that which would naturally be indicated by his 
examination in chief, such previous declarations 
may be shown, although they are not directly 
contradictory to any specific statement made on 
his examination in chief/ (Citing eases.)" 
The same evidentiary principle was applied in People 
V. Murata, 326 P. 2d 947 (Cal. 1958) under slightly differ-
ent facts. There, the cross-examiner had asked the witness 
about an earlier appraisal he had made of the condemned 
property in 1954 for $1,500.00 per acre. His opinion at trial 
in 1956 ranged between $10,000.00 to $43,000.00 an acre. 
The trial Court sustained an objection to the cross-examina-
tion, stating: 
"You are going to get into collateral matters 
which can be extremely serious here. I am confident 
you have gone as far as you can." 
On appeal, it was determined that the exclusionary ruling 
constituted reversible error: 
"We conclude that this ruling operated unduly 
to restrict the cross-examination. It is well settled 
that 'the value of the opinion evidence of a witness 
may be tested by showing that upon a former occa-
sion he expressed a different opinion, or made state-
ments inconsistent with the opinion expressed/ 26 
Cal. Jur. 155, §128." 
Counsel for the State argued before the trial Court 
herein that the refusal to permit cross-examination of 
JOHNS on the Condas appraisal was within the discretion 
of the trial judge and was not error, since the question in-
volved the collateral matter of impeachment. Murata, su-
pra, Basch V. Iowa Poiver and Light Co., supra, the Bing-
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aman case and others cited herein are a ready answer to 
the contention that the denial of cross-examination was dis-
cretionary with the trial Court, and State V. Peek, 1 U. 2d 
263, 265 P. 2d 630 (1953) and Alford V. U. S., supra, closes 
the argument that impeachment examination is a collateral 
matter from which prejudice does not ensue. 
The prejudice flowing from the trial Court's ruling 
herein is easily spotted. Appearing as the last value witness 
in the trial and as the first appraiser who had made a radi-
cal departure from all the other witnesses on the value of 
the north industrial land of Defendant prior to the "tak-
ing", (P. 26 this Brief, Appx. 1-5), JOHNS in flippant and 
staccato style, gave his opinion on the value of the total 
tract "before". (Tr. 799, Ex. P-14) The man's finding was 
$728,060.00 belotv the "before" value of FRANCIS SOLO-
MON and $441,020.00 lower than the other State witness, 
R. S. FLETCHER. The result was astonishing and it 
changed the entire atmosphere of the trial. His opinion was 
so far out of line with even the simple average values of the 
others that either he was right, in which case the other 4 
witnesses were totally wrong, or JOHNS was, himself, 
grossly misinformed, or he was a fraud, or an advocate for 
his client, or a combination of the three. And so cross-ex-
amination commenced with this witness after a week and 
one-half of trial with the cards all on the table face up and 
with Defendant's counsel assigned the task of finding out 
which of these alternatives was correct. It tvas the pivotal 
point of the trial 
The comparability of the Condas and Taggart proper-
ties, lying side by side with similar access and zoning is not 
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open to reasonable question, particularly in view of some 
of the other sales to which JOHNS had eluded. If JOHNS 
had appraised the Condas tract at $10,000.00 per acre at a 
previous time for the landowner, and now had appraised 
the subject property at $4,000.00 and $2,000.00 an acre 
for the State, it would provide the answer to JOHNS' ap-
praisal. It would expose him as a fake, an advocate for his 
particular client, and as a witness whose opinion was so 
insubstantial that it would be discarded as unworthy of be-
lief. What would be his answer to this all important ques-
tion? 
We don't know. We will never know until a new trial 
is ordered because the Court stopped the cross-examination 
at this point. The probability is that the answer would have 
dealt a devastating blow to the credibility of JOHNS' opin-
ion. And the lower Court made its ruling complete, in ad-
dition to sustaining the State's objection, by admonishing 
the jury to disregard even the question. (Tr. 844) 
The prejudice from this error is revealed in the an-
swer to jury Interrogatory 1, which was answered in the 
sum of $2,775,911.00. There is only bne opinion which 
would begin to support the lowness of that finding — AND 
THAT IS THE TESTIMONY OF A.B.C. JOHNS, JR. The 
jury had to give consideration to the JOHNS' appraisal, 
for there was no other testimony that would have justified 
the paucity of this finding. But for JOHNS' opinion, the 
interrogatories as returned, would be subject to an order 
of additur or new trial, as a matter of law. Porcupine Res-
ervoir Co, V. Keller Corp., 15 U. 2d 318, 392 P. 2d 620 
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(1964); Weber Basin Conservancy Dist. V. Moore, 2 U. 2d 
254, 272 P. 2d 176 (1954). Had JOHNS been required to 
answer the question on the Condas appraisal, the result in 
this case would no doubt have been substantially different. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED PREJUDICIALLY 
IN PERMITTING THE QUESTION OF SPE-
CIAL BENEFITS UNDER THE TESTIMONY 
OF A.B.C. JOHNS, JR. TO BE CONSIDERED 
BY THE JURY. 
1. No definition of or foundation for Special 
Benefits was made by the State in the testimony 
of Johns. 
It has been some time since this Court last considered 
a case in eminent domain where the issue of special benefits 
was squarely raised. The question was touched briefly in 
Weber Basin Conservancy Dist. v. Braegger, 8 U. 2d 346, 
334 P. 2d 758 (1959). Before that it was in the case of 
Cook V. Salt Lake City, et al.} 48 Utah 58, 157 Pac. 643 
(1916). Nonetheless, it is clear enough in this jurisdiction 
that in an eminent domain suit to establish Just Compen-
sation, benefits from the highway project which specially 
improve the value of the Defendant's remainder lands may 
be considered by the trier of fact. 78-34-10(4) U.C.A. 1953;5 
Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 253, 90 Pac. 395 (1907) ; 
Oregon Shortline V. Fox, 28 Utah 311, 78 Pac. 800 (1904). 
5Although the Statute makes reference to "benefits" only, judicial 
construction, in line with the general rule, requires a showing of 
special enhancement. 
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But there are two conditions to this rule of compensa-
tion. One is that the benefits must be special to the remain-
der property, since general benefits are inadmissible and 
irrelevant. Salt Lake U. & R. Co. V. Butterfield, 46 Utah 
431, 150 Pac. 931 (1915). The other condition is that a 
special benefit is material only to the extent that it off-sets 
severance damage to remaining land. It may not be used 
to diminish the compensation to which the owner is entitled 
for the "taking". 78-34-10 (4) U.C.A. 1953. A sound defi-
nition of special vis-a-vis general benefits is set forth in 
Hempstead V. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 261, 90 Pac. 397 
(1909), as being a special advantage, such as added con-
venience, accessibility, or new use, accruing as a direct con-
sequence of the public project, contrasted to a general bene-
fit running to the larger community from the public work. 
JOHNS failed to define what he meant by a special 
benefit. He did not set forth one sale of property which 
had been similarly benefitted from a non-access freeway 
and he provided not one scintilla of objective data to under-
lie his claim. All that he said was that the industrial land 
remaining west of the freeway was specially benefitted 
because of the "arterial interchange" of 1-215 and 2100 
South, and that such benefit was $26,582.00. 
The Court erred in permitting, over objection of De-
fendant's counsel, benefits to be at all considered by the 
jury. There was not adequate foundation and evidence to 
support a finding of the same. Although the factors which 
the willing and informed buyer and seller would recognize 
should be taken into account, "an opinion based ex-
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clusively upon one factor should be rejected." Nichols on 
Eminent Domain, Vol. 5, P. 245, Sec. 18.42(1) (3rd Ed.). 
To affirm a jury interrogatory under which special benefits 
are submitted, something more than an. unsupported guess 
of a witness is necessary. 
2. The lower Court erred in refusing to permit 
cross-examination of JOHNS on the nature of the 
Special Benefits claimed. 
JOHNS alleged that the benefits to Defendant's re-
mainder lands emanated from the arterial freeway. Os-
tensibly, this meant that traffic and activity would be 
brought to the area by the freeway that was not thereto-
fore existent. There is no other explanation. On cross-ex-
amination, counsel for Defendant inquired of JOHNS as 
to whether the traffic that would be placed on the freeway 
was not, in fact, the same traffic movement and activity 
existent on Redwood Road, at the date of "taking". The 
question ran directly to the impeachment and invalidity of 
the special benefits argument and was not an attempt to 
show damage by virtue of loss of traffic flow on Redwood 
Road. The latter is damnum absque injuria, Hislop V. 
Weber Basin Conservancy Dist., 12 U. 2d 64, 362 P. 2d 580 
(1961); State Road Comm. V. Rozelle, et ux., 101 Utah 464, 
120 P. 2d 276 (1942), and no claim was ever made by De-
fendant at trial for its recovery. 
The Court erred in sustaining the objection of imma-
teriality to the question. All factors which the buyer and 
seller would reasonably consider in determining special 
benefits as well as damages, are properly within the per-
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view of cross-examination. State v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 
P. 2d 630 (1953); State Road Comm. v. Woolley, 15 U. 2d 
167, 397 P. 2d 463 (1964). 
POINT IV 
THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE LOWER COURT 
ON BURDEN OF PROOF AND PREPONDER-
ANCE OF EVIDENCE WERE ERRONEOUS TO 
T H E DEFENDANT'S DETRIMENT A N D 
PREJUDICE. 
1. Instructions 18, 19, and 30 unduly and unfairly 
repeated and emphasized the Defendant-landown-
er's burden of proof and preponderance on the 
value of the property, before and after the "tak-
ing". 
The Court charged the jury that the landowner carried 
to the trial the burden of proving, by a fair preponderance 
of the evidence, the truth of its contentions on land value 
and damages caused by the "taking". Such principle of 
evidentiary procedure has been the rule in the conduct of 
eminent domain litigation in Utah since early days. Oregon 
Shortline R. Co. V. Russell, et al., 27 Utah 457, 76 Pac. 345 
(1904); Tanner V. Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., 40 
Utah 105, 121 Pac. 584 (1911); State Road Comm. V. Peter-
son, 12 U. 2d 317, 366 P. 2d 76 (1961). It is a harsh and 
unfair rule and should be changed, prospectively. For the 
Government to "take" by right of eminent domain a man's 
property against his will, and then say to him that he must 
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prove its value by the preponderance of evidence, imposes 
an unreasonable and often severe burden upon the citizen.6 
It was not the adoption of the rule by the trial Court, 
however, that constituted prejudicial error in this case. 
Rather, it was the manner in which the rule was used in the 
charge to the jury that created the prejudice to Defendant. 
Both Instructions 18 and 19 of the Court focus on the same 
subject matter—burden of proof and preponderance of the 
evidence. Each declares the burden is on the landowner to 
prove land value and damages by the "preponderance of the 
evidence". Each defines the quality of evidence necessary 
to preponderate and each charges the jury to find against 
the Defendant if the preponderance test is not satisfied. 
Number 18 states: 
"You are instructed that the burden of proving 
the value of the land being acquired by the State of 
Utah and the burden of proving damages, if any, 
to the remaining lands are burdens which the law 
places upon the defendants. These burdens of proof 
are successfully carried by defendants only if you 
find that they have established the truth of their 
contentions by the preponderance of the evidence. A 
"preponderance of the evidence" is defined as the 
amount of evidence which is more convincing as to 
its truth, or which convinces the mind of the jury 
that a proposition is more probably true than not 
true. / / , in your deliberations, you believe that the 
evidence introduced by both parties as to the land 
6In a number of jurisdictions, the burden is placed on the condemnor 
to prove the value of the "taking". See discussion in 5 Nichols on 
Eminent Domain 300 #18.5 (3rd Ed.). If the landowner contends 
that his remaining property is damaged by the "taking", he should, 
in all events, have the burden of proof on that issue. 
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taken and the damages, if any, to the remaining 
lands is evenly balanced then you will reject the 
contentions advanced by the defendants." (R. 41) 
(Emphasis ours) 
The pertinent sections of Instruction 19 are: 
"Whenever in these instructions I state that the 
"burden" or "burden of proof" rests or is placed 
upon a certain party to prove the existence of a cer-
tain fact, the meaning of such instruction is this: 
That unless the party with whom the burden of 
proof rests proves, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, the truthfulness of the alleged fact you shall 
find against such party in your determination of 
such fact. Specifically, if the defendant landowners 
fail to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the 
truthfulness of the facts which they allege, you shall 
find against the defendant landoivners in your de-
liberation of such fact. (Emphasis added) 
"The term "preponderance of the evidence" 
does not mean the greater number of witnesses nor 
the sheer amount of testimony adduced . . ." (R. 42) 
Instruction 30 then again affirms that the Defendant 
carries the burden of proof by the preponderance, but in 
addition, charges that the Defendant has an extra burden 
. . . the amount of compensation: 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 30 
In making your findings of fact you should bear in 
mind that the burden of proving the amount of com-
pensation to which defendants are entitled is upon 
the defendants, and the defendants must prove it 
by a preponderance of the evidence." 
This was the same sheet of paper which contained the 
special interrogatories and answer blanks for the jury. The 
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foreman also signed at the bottom of it upon the jury's 
return. 
While repetitive and cumulative instructions to a jury 
on a particular point do not necessarily constitute reversible 
error, they are not favored. Taylor v. Johnson, 15 U. 2d 
342, 393 P. 2d 382 (1964). Where the cumulation is not 
merely redundent, and where the repetition is directed to 
material and substantive factors in the suit, the error is 
prejudicial. Taylor V. Johnson, supra. The reason is that 
it emphasizes and fixes unfairly and unreasonably in the 
minds of the jury the matter which is repeated. Three times 
in the space of 30 short instructions the jury in the case 
at Bar was charged on the necessity of Defendant meeting 
its burden of proof. It is fair to assume that the jurors 
could have been, due to the emphasis and repetition, under 
the impression that the Defendant bore an overwhelming 
burden and obligation to prove its case in chief, rather than 
fixing their attention on what the believable evidence 
showed to be the truth in the cause. 
Instruction 30, in itself, is wholly erroneous in its state-
ment that Defendant has the burden of proving "the amount 
of compensation''. While the burden of proof placed on the 
Defendant extends to the value of the "taking" and to dam-
ages to the remaining lands, it does not require proof of 
special benefits, or the lack thereof. That burden rests with 
the condemnor. Tanner V. Provo Bench Canal & Irr, Co., 
40 Utah 105, 121 Pac. 584 (1911). The charge, however, 
as given to the jury, obligates the landowner, in "proving 
the amount of compensation", to also prove the absence of 
special benefits. 
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The harmful effect of the three burden of proof in-
structions, 18, 19 and 30, constitutes prejudicial error. 
2. Instructions 18 and 19 are further erroneous, 
for they direct a verdict against Defendant-land-
owner if the latter does not meet its full prepon-
derance. 
Instruction 18 charges the jury: 
"If in your deliberations, you believe that the evi-
dence introduced by both parties as to land taken 
and the damages, if any, to the remaining lands is 
evenly balanced, you shall reject the contentions 
advanced by the Defendants" (R. 41) 
Instruction 19 is similar in its statement that if the land-
owner fails to prove its case by a preponderance: 
"you shall find against the defendant landowners 
in your deliberation of such fact." (R. 42) 
The trouble with both Instructions is that it gives the 
jury no choice in considering the testimony and evidence 
of the Defendant. Under such Instruction, if the Defendant 
satisfies its burden of proof, the interrogatories would be 
answered in accordance with the landowner's evidence. But 
if the Defendant does not fulfill its total burden, then the 
Instructions direct the jury to "find against and reject the 
contentions of the landowners". The jury must have some 
opinion evidence upon which to return its verdict and since, 
with the landowner's evidence gone, there is no evidence 
left other than that of the State, the Instructions, by impli-
cation, direct the jury to accept the State's testimony. For 
all practical purposes, that is just what the jury did by its 
answers to interrogatories. 
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The Court did not instruct as it should have, that if 
the preponderance of the testimony and evidence was less 
than the value conclusions of the Defendant but more than 
the value conclusions of the Plaintiff, the interrogatories 
could be answered within that range of the testimony where 
the weight fairly preponderated. 
Both Instructions 18 and 19 are framed with the typi-
cal contract or negligence suit in mind. They are inapplic-
able and erroneous in an eminent domain trial on Just Com-
pensation. This Court has before made its record on the 
point that an instruction which specifically or by inference 
directs the jury to find certain material facts, is erroneous 
and prejudicial. Valiotis v. Utah-Apex Mining Co., 55 Utah 
151, 184 Pac. 802 (1919). Instructions 18 and 19 fit within 
the qualifications of that rule. 
CONCLUSION 
There is simply no way to get around the hard fact 
that the interrogatories returned by the jury are in viola-
tion of the great and clear weight of the testimony on the 
market value of the property, before and after the "taking". 
Such answers do not begin to represent any reasonable ap-
praisal of the land value and damages under the test in 
Bodon V. Suhrmann, 8 U 2d 42, 327 P. 2d 826 (1958), be-
cause there is no substantial and believable evidence to 
support them. The trial Court should have ordered a new 
trial on the basis of inadequacy of the award, their being 
no substantial and believable evidence to support it. 
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The trial Court committed reversible error in refusing 
to allow, at the key point of the trial, cross-examination by 
Defendant's counsel of A.B.C. JOHNS, JR., State witness, 
on his appraisal of the neighboring Condas property; and 
in permitting the question of special benefits, under the 
testimony of JOHNS, to go to the jury. It further com-
mitted prejudicial error, to the detriment of Defendant, in 
Instructions 18, 19, and 30, with respect to the nature of 
Defendant's burden of proof in the case. 
Truth and justice did not prevail in the lower Court. 
A new trial on Just Compensation should be ordered, it is 
respectfully submitted. 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
of 
PARSONS, BEHLE, EVANS & 
LATIMER 
520 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Appellant 
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APPENDIX 1 
APPRAISAL OF 
C. FRANCIS SOLOMON — M.A.I. 
(926.7 Acres) Value of Entire Property BEFORE Condemnation 
Zone Acreage Value per Acre Value 
MUL 2&5 $5,500.00 $156,750.00 
25.-2100 So. 5,500.00 137,500.00 T o*al 
M-2 180.-balance 4,235.00 764,920.00 
10,-East 10,000.00 100,000.00 Value 
C-2 29.8-bal. 6,000.00 178,800.00 
R-5 119.8 3,500.00 419,300.00 Before 
X 5 601 4,500.00 270,450.00 
A-l 7.0 2,328.00 16,296.00 $3,169,651.00 
35.-3100 So. 3,500.00 122,500.00 
Unzoned 430.9-bal. 2,328.00 1,003,135.00 
TOTALS 926.7 $3,169,651.00 
(848.59 Acres) Value of Remaining Property AFTER Condemnation 
Zone Acreage Value per Acre Value 
M-l 28.5 $5,000.00 $142,500.00 
8 0 0 2,541.00 Remaining 
M-2 76.0 4,235.00 531,561.00 
C-2 39.8 No damage 278,800.00 Value 
R-5 119.8 3,500.00 419,300.00 
A-2 60.1 4,050.00 243,405.00 After 
A-l 7.0 2,328.00 16,296.00 
119.-W. of P.L. 2,170.00 258,587.00 $2,609,766.00 
21.4-E " W.F/W 1,400.00 29,960.00 
45.9-E. F / W 2,049.00 94,049.00 
204.5 " 2,328.00 476,308.00 
Unzoned* 34.0-3100 So. 3,500.00 119,000.00 
TOTALS 848.59 $2,609,766.00 
DIFFERENCE IN BEFORE AND AFTER (Rounded)...$560,000.00 
Value of land Condemned: Industrial-49.11 Acres $239,605.00 
Residential-29.00 Acres 68,684.00 
Severance Damage 251,711.00 
TOTAL OPINION $560,000.00 
*P.L. = Pole Line; F / W = Free Way. E. "W.F/W = East of Pole 
Line & West of Free Way. 
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APPRAISAL OF 
WERNER KIEPE — M.A.I. 
(926.7 Acres) Value of Entire Property BEFORE Condemnation 
Zone Acreage Value per Acre Value 
103' x 330' $ 100.00 $ 10,300.00 
F / F 
M-l 27.72 4,000.00 110,880.00 Total 
70.0 W. of P/L 5,500.00 385,000.00 
M-2 135.6 E. of P/L 6,500.00 881,400.00 Value 
~ 1600' x 330' 120.00 192,000.00 
F / F Before 
C-2 27.68 5,000.00 138,400.00 
1400' x 330' 75.00 105,000.00 $3,448,920.00 
F / F 
R-5 109.19 4,500.00 491,355.00 
A^l 7X) 750.00 5,250.00 
A-2 60.1 6,000.00 360,600.00 
Unzoned 465.9 1,650.00 768,735.00 
TOTALS 926.7 $3,448,920.00 : 
(848.59 Acres) Value of Remaining Property AFTER Condemnation 
Zone Acreage Value per Acre Value 
M-l 28.5 Same as Before $121,180.00 
34.12 E. of F / W $5,000.00 170,600.00 _ . . 
52.58 W. of F / W Remaining 
& E. of P.L. 4,500.00 236,610.00 
M-2 70.0 W. of P.L. 5,500.00 385,000.00 Value 
1600' x 330' 100.00 160,000.00 
F / F After 
C-2 27.68 (rear) 4,500.00 124,560.00 
R^5 119.8 Same as Before 596,355.00 $2,773,750.00 
A-l 7.0 Same as Before 5,250.00 
A-2 60.1 Same as Before 360,600.00 
119.0 W. of P.L. 1,500.00 178,500.00 
26.9 E. of P.L. 
& W. of F / W 500.00 13,450.00 
Unzoned 290.79 E. of F / W 1,450.00 421,645.00 
TOTALS 848.59 $2,773,750.00 
DIFFERENCE IN BEFORE AND A F T E R T $675,170.00 
Value of land Condemned: Industrial-48.9 Acres $317,850.00 
Residential-29.00 Acres 48,197.00 
Severance Damage 309,120.00 
TOTAL OPINION $675,170.00 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX 3 
APPRAISAL OF 
MAXWELL S. LOLL — A.S.A. 
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DIFFERENCE IN BEFORE AND AFTER $672,520.00 
Value of land Condemned: Industrial-49.11 Acres $270,105.00 
Residential-29.00 Acres 87,000.00 
Severance Damage 315,415.00 
TOTAL OPINION $672,520.00 
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TOTALS 848.59 $2,550,500.00 
DIFFERENCE $ 332,120.00 
VALUE OF LAND TAKEN 
Land Total 
Type Acreage Value per Acre Value 
21st South: 
Front 1320' 43.07 $6,000.00 $258,420.00 
Rear 1320' 6.04 5,000.00 30,200.00 
Unzoned: 
(Balance) 29.00 1,500.00 43,500.00 
TOTALS 7 8 l i $ 332,120.00 
DAMAGES TO REMAINDER NONE 
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A. B. C. JOHNS — APPRAISER 
VALUE BEFORE TAKING 
Land Total 
Type Acreage Value per Acre Value 
M-l 
21st So. Fr. 69.06 $4,000.00 $276,240.00 
21st So. Rear 136.54 2,300.00 314,042.00 
(Fr. 9.56 5,200.00 49,712.00 
Redwood (R. 18.94 3,000.00 56,820.0$ 
Unzoned 
W/o Lake 275.90 1,725.00 475,927.00 
Unzoned 
Lake 190.00 177.00 33,630.00 
C-2 39.80 10,580.00 421,084.00 
A-2 60.10 4,356.00 261,795.00 
A-l 7!0 4,356.00 30,492.00 
R-5 119.80 4,356.00 521,849.00 
TOTALS 926.7 $2,441,591.00 
VALUE AFTER TAKING 
Land Total 
Type Acreage Value per Acre Value 
21st So. Fr. 25\99 $2,300.00 $ 59,777.00 
21st So. Rear 130.71 2,300.00 300,633.00 
(Fr. 9.56 5,200.00 49,712.00 
Redwood (R. 18.94 3,000.00 56,820.00 
Unzoned 
W/o Lake 246.69 1,725.00 425,540.00 
Unzoned 
Lake 190.00 177.00 33,630.00 
C-2 39.80 10,580.00 421,084.00 
Other (A-2, 
A-l, R-5) 186.90 4,356.00 814,136.00 
TOTALS 848.59 $2,161,332.00 
DIFFERENCE $ 280,259.00 
VALUE OF LAND TAKEN 
Land Total 
Type Acreage Value per Acre Value 
21st So. Fr. 
M-l, M-2 43.07 $4,000.00 $172,280.00 
21st So. Rear 
M-2 5^83 2,300.00 13,409.00 
Unzoned 29.21 1,725.00 50,387.00 
TOTALS 78.11 $ 236,076.00 
DAMAGES TO REMAINDER 
Land Total 
Type Acreage Value per Acre Value 
21st So. Fr. 
M-l, M-2 25.99 $1,700.00 $ 44,183.00 
TOTALS 25.99 $ 44,183.00 
SPECIAL BENEFITS TO REMAINDER 
Land Total 
Type Acreage Value per Acre Value 
21st So. 
M-l, M-2 46.23 $ 575.00 $ 26,582.00 
TOTALS 46.23 —$ 26,582.00 
Net Damages to Remainder $ 17,601.00 
Value of land taken 236,076.00 TOTAL $253,677.00 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 




















1 I l 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
